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RUSSELL B. LONG*

United States Law and
the International
Anti-Dumping Code
On June 30, 1967, the United States entered into an executive
agreement with 17 other nations establishing an International Antidumping Code.' The President's Special Trade Representative signed
this agreement unconditionally and without reservation, on the ground
that nothing contained in it conflicted with domestic law. Each of the
other signatories, however, signed subject to approval by its parliament.
The agreement went into effect on July 1, 1968, although not all
signatories had implemented the Code as of that date 2
On September 9, 1968, the Senate acted to suspend United States
participation in the Code, by an amendment to this effect to House bill
17324 (the Renegotiation Amendments Act of 1968). After the House
disagreed with the Senate amendment, the matter went to a conference
at which a compromise was reached. The compromise, enacted as Title
II of Public Law 90-634, approved October 24, 1968, in effect permits
domestic application of the provisions of the Code only to the extent
that they (1) do not conflict with domestic law, and (2) do not limit
the discretion of the Tariff Commission in its injury-determination
function under the Antidumping Act of 1921.
* United States Senator from Louisiana, Chairman, Senate Committee on Finance.
1 The other signatories are Belgium, Canada, The Netherlands, Luxembourg, France,
Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Denmark, Norway, Sweden,
Switzerland, Finland, The United Kingdom, Japan and Yugoslavia.
2 The most important signatory, as far as United
States trade is concerned, is Canada,
whose parliament had not ratified the Code on July 1. The Canadian Government informed the
United States that although legislation necessary to implement the Code could not be enacted
before July 1 due to the dissolution of Parliament for elections, it "is prepared to undertake
that not later than 1 January 1969, it will bring its laws, regulations and administrative
procedures into conformity with the Agreement." However, it has been reported in the press
(Journal of Commerce, November 8, 1968) that "Canada's proposed antidumping legislation
will not contain a definition of injury caused by dumping." This would mean that Canada will
not adopt the definition of injury specified by the International Antidumping Code.
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What motivated Congress to limit U. S. implementation of this
executive agreement? Obviously, there were compelling reasons, the
basic one being that the Code's provisions might have had the effect of
changing domestic Federal statutory law, without the approval of the
Congress.
A background on the nature of dumping in international trade and
on United States laws dealing with dumping, and a comparison between
the Code and the Antidumping Act, form a helpful prelude to
discussion of the impact of the Code on our internal law.
Nature of "Dumping" and Antidumping Act of 1921
Dumping, in a foreign-trade sense, occurs whenever there are (or
are likely to be) "sales at less than fair value" of foreign merchandise in
the United States, causing (or likely to cause) injury to a domestic
industry.
Concern for providing a remedy against injurious dumping by
foreign producers dates far, back in American history. In the years
immediately after the War of 1812, Americans were already accusing
English manufacturers of "deliberately dumping their products in the
United States in order to crush out new industries which had developed
during the war." 3
Judging from the following statement of Henry (later Lord)
Brougham in the House of Commons on April 9, 1816, these fears were
justified:
It was well worthwhile to incur a loss upon the first exportation, in
order, by the glut, to stifle in the cradle those rising manufactures in
the United States which the war had forced into existence contrary to
the natural course of things. 4

During the early years of the present century, there were
widespread fears that large, well-financed trusts and cartels were selling
their products at lower prices in foreign markets than at home, in order
to dispose of excess stocks or to lower their unit costs. As a result of
these fears, antidumping statutes were enacted in Canada in 1904, in
Australia in 1906, in South Africa in 1914, and in the United States in
the Revenue Act of 1916.
3 VINER, DUMPING: A PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 39 Chicago:
University of Chicago Press (1923).
4 XXXIII Hansard, 1st Series (1816), 1098-99.
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Under the 1916 Act, "predatory" dumping in the United States is
prohibited, and criminal penalties are provided.' That Act has not
worked well as a deterrent to dumping generally, mainly because it is
limited, in its criminal aspect, to "predatory" dumping, a concept
difficult to prove in a criminal case. Also, United States jurisdiction
over acts committed abroad designed to affect commerce in this
country, had not yet been established. 6
After it became clear that the 1916 Act did not offer a realistic
remedy, the Tariff Commission was requested to report to the House
Ways and Means Committee on the operation of the Canadian
antidumping law. 7 The Commission reported that the Canadian law
seemed to have operated successfully as a check on dumping, although
it was questionable whether the same enforcement procedures would
work in the United States. 8
In 1921, a new antidumping bill was passed by the House and
referred to the Senate Finance Committee. Like the Canadian law, the
new bill would have assessed special dumping duties against any kind of
dumping in competition with a domestic industry, without requiring a
showing of injury. Dumping duties were to be imposed simply if the
"dumped" goods were competitive with articles produced in the United
States.
An injury requirement was incorporated into the bill by the
Senate Finance Committee, but the Committee report indicates that
this was done to facilitate administration of the Act, not to restrict its
operation. A representative of the Customs Service had testified that it
would be impossible to enforce the House bill with their present staff,
because it would require that every importation be checked for
dumping, and this in turn would require that the home market value of
5 39 Stat. 798, 15 USC 72. The law stipulates for imposition of a $5000 fine, or
imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both. In addition, injured parties may sue for treble
damages. There has been only one reported case under this statute, and it did not involve a
substantive determination. H. Wagner & Adler Co. v. Mali, 74 F.2d 666 (CA 2-1935). However,
the law has never been repealed.
6 American Banana Company v. United Fruit Company, 213 US 347 (1909).
7 The Canadian Act provided for the assessment of dumping duties on any import
for
sale at less than fair market value, if a comparable article was produced in Canada.
8 The Commission pointed out that the Canadian law was
aimed largely at United
States firms, and that the Canadian authorities had developed dependable sources of
information in the United States. The United States, on the other hand, was faced with
dumping by countries in Europe and Asia, where information on prices and costs was far more
difficult to acquire.
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every importation be checked in the exporting country. In its report on
the bill, the Committee noted that the purpose of its amendment was
to relieve the Customs Service of the necessity of examining every
importation for possible violation of the statute. 9 The House conferees
agreed to the amendment, and the act was passed.' 0
Discussing the foregoing legislative history, in Orlowitz Co. v.
United States, 47 Cust. Ct. 583, 590 (1961), aff'd 50 CCPA 36, the
court said:
There was no suggestion, as we read the Senate proposal and
proceedings, of intention either to limit or enlarge the concept of
"injury" intended in the House bill, where the mandate was to each
individual appraising officer in his own district. Mere intention to
improve administration is not persuasive of an intention to change the
scope of the law. The clearly expressed intention was to facilitate
administration, and no intention was expressed other than to do that.
This is persuasive of a legislative intention that the basic objectives were
not to be changed.
In addition to the Antidumping Act of 1921, and the Revenue Act
of 1916, the price-discrimination aspect of dumping is dealt with in the
Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890 (15 USC 1), the Wilson Tariff Act of
1894 (15 USC 8), the Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 (15 USC
45), and Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 USC 1337).
However, the principal comparisons herein, between the International
Antidumping Code and United States law, will be made with reference
to the Antidumping Act of 1921. It is sufficient to say at this point,
that Congress has declared price discrimination in domestic and foreign
commerce to be unlawful; but since it is virtually impossible to
prosecute foreign producers guilty of dumping, Congress has provided
an alternative remedy in the form of special dumping duties imposed on
the offending goods under the Antidumping Act of 1921. Virtually all
proceedings since 1921 have been brought under this Act.
Under that statute, the Treasury Department has the responsibility
of determining whether [or not] there has been price discrimination,

9 "The House bill made it necessary for the appraising officers to look for dumping in
the case of each importation of merchandise, and, in the case of merchandise procured
otherwise than by purchase, required a bond of the importer that would obligate him to furnish
the collector upon the sale of the merchandise the selling price of the merchandise and to pay
additional dumping duties that might be found due. It is the opinion of your committee that
the House provision is too drastic and places too great a burden upon the administrative officers
of the customs service and upon the importer." Senate Report 16, 67th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 10.
10 Act of May 27, 1921, 42 Stat. 11, 19 USC 160ff
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i.e., sales at "less than fair value." Such "LTFV" sales are usually at a
price lower than that at which the goods are sold in the home market of
the foreign exporter, or in third-country markets. Once the Treasury
Department determines that there are LTFV sales, the case goes to the
Tariff Commission for an injury determination. If no LTFV sales are
found by the Treasury, the case is closed.
It is important to note that no statutory criteria are provided to
guide the Tariff Commission in its injury-determination function.
Section 201(a) of the Act simply states:
Whenever the Secretary of the Treasury ...determines that a class or

kind of foreign merchandise is being, or is likely to be, sold in the
United States or elsewhere at less than its fair value, he shall so advise
the United States Tariff Commission, and the said Commission shall
determine within three months thereafter whether an industry in the
United States is being, or is likely to be, injured, or is prevented from
being established, by reason of the importation of such merchandise
into the United States.' '
On the basis of two affirmative determinations--one by the
Secretary of the Treasury that there is, or is likely to be price
discrimination, and another by the Tariff Commission that such price
discrimination has resulted, or is likely to result, in injury to a domestic
industry-the Secretary of the Treasury, through the Bureau of
Customs, must issue a finding of dumping under which he assesses a
special dumping duty on the dumped merchandise. This duty is an
amount equal to the difference between the home-market price and the
dumped price.
The actual imposition of antidumping duties, in relation to the
number of cases brought to the attention of the Treasury, has been
small. Between 1955 and January 1, 1969, 376 complaints have been
made to the Treasury Department. Of these, 230 were dismissed on a
determination of no sales at less than fair value; 89 were dismissed
because the foreign exporter agreed to revise his prices at less than fair
value;" and 40 of the 57 cases which have gone to the Tariff
Commission for injury determinations have resulted in a finding of no
injury. Thus, only 17 of the original 376 complaints have resulted in a
11 The Treasury Department originally made both determinations. By the Customs
Simplification Act of 1954, Congress transferred the injury-determination function to the
Tariff Commission.
12 There is some question as to whether the Treasury is exceeding its authority in
closing out cases on the basis of price revisions or assurances by the foreign exporter that the
dumping will stop. This is discussed in greater detail below.
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dumping finding and the imposition of dumping duties.
International Antidumping Code
In extending the President's trade-agreement power by the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962, Congress did not authorize any modification in
the Antidumping Act of 1921. The Report of the Senate Finance
Committee on the 1962 Act is clear on this point: "Other laws not
intended to be affected include the Antidumping Act and section 303
of the Tariff Act of 1930 which relates to countervailing duties."' '

In testifying before the House Committee on Ways and Means on
the

1962 Act,

Secretary

of the Treasury Dillon said it was his

understanding that "there is no change at all in the antidumping
procedure so far as this bill is concerned."'

'

Another administration

spokesman, Secretary of Commerce Hodges. gave broad assurances that
the government would not act under the 1962 legislation to undermine
statutory protection against unfair foreign competition.' s It should be
noted, however, that the President's Special Trade Representative never
took the position that the Trade Expansion Act alone provided

authority to negotiate the Code. Rather, he stated, the Code was
negotiated pursuant to the President's constitutional authority to
conduct foreign affairs, and to section 241(a) of the Trade Expansion
Act.' 6 This view was presented to the Senate Finance Committee
during hearings on the International Antidumping Code.' 1
The initial impetus for the Code apparently came from European
countries' dissatisfaction with our law. This is borne out in an article

authored by one of the key United States negotiators of the Code, Mr.
'3

Senate Report 2059, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., page 19.

14 Hearings on H.R. 9900 before the House Ways and Means Committee,
87th Cong.,

2nd Sess., Pt. 2, pp. 897-98.
Is Secretary Hodges said: "I am resolved that the Government shall take no action in
the field of tariff policy that will work undue hardship to U. S. industry, workers and farmers
through unfair competition. "Ibid. Part 1, p. 81 (Emphasis added). During the Trade Expansion
Act hearings in 1962, and the hearings on the International Dumping Code in June of this year,
the Senate Committee on Finance received no statements from United States exporters or
export associations which supported either the desirability of negotiating an international
antidumping code, or provisions of the Code, as finally agreed.
16 Section 241(a) of that Act gave authority for
the President to appoint a Special
Trade Representative who would represent the United States not only in negotiations under the
Act, but also in "other negotiations as in the President's judgment require that the Special
Representative be the chief representative of the United States .... " Trade Expansion Act of
1962. 76 Stat. 878.
17 Committee on Finance, U. S. Senate, Hearings
on the International Antidumping
Code, 90th Congress, 2nd Session, June 27, 1968. p. 42-3.
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John B. Rehm, General Counsel for the Office of Special Trade
Representative.
Mr. Rehm stated:
Aside from the Canadian antidumping law, which antedated and to
some extent influenced our law, only the U. S. Antidumping Act has
been actively administered for a number of years. While dumping duties
have been imposed in relatively few cases, the activities of the
Department of the Treasury, and especially the withholding of
appraisement as a provisional remedy, have aroused considerable
interest in, and criticism of, the Antidumping Act. Because of the
feelings of the EEC and the United Kingdom, in particular, on this
subject, it was agreed that a Group on Antidumping Policies would be
formed .... The early meetings of this group were used as an
opportunity for the most part to criticize provisions of the Antidumping Act and its administration.(Emphasis added). 1 8

Mr. Rehm went on to explain:
The United States was also concerned about the substantive standards
used by other countries in imposing dumping duties. It felt that, if
tariffs were substantially reduced in the Kennedy Round, countries
might well be tempted to invoke antidumping laws to protect querulous
domestic industries. Moreover, the EEC was itself in the process of
considering antidumping regulations which would supplant national
legislation in the member states. Accordingly, the United States
concluded that the negotiation of an Antidumping Code might permit
the views of the major exporting countries to have a significant impact
upon the substance of the EEC regulation.' 9
When it became known in 1965 that our representatives were
involved in the negotiations of an international antidumping code,
despite the clear intention of the Congress that there should be no
tampering with the Antidumping Act during the Kennedy Round of
trade negotiations, the Committee on Finance and the Senate responded by adopting Senate Concurrent Resolution 100. This was
intended to express the sense of the Congress that the United States
should not enter into any agreement looking toward the modification
of any tariff or other import restriction, except pursuant to express
authority delegated in advance by Congress. In its report S. Con. Res.
100, the Committee stated:
The Committee on Finance has been disturbed over reports that the
current Kennedy round of tariff negotiations may be broadened to
include U. S. offers of concessions with respect to matters for which
there is no existing delegated authority. In the committee's view, this
18 The Kennedy Round of Trade Negotiations,62 AM. J. INT'L. L. 427-28 (1968).
'9 Id., at 430.
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would violate the principles which have made our reciprocal trade
program so successful for more than three decades.
Another area may involve the treatment of "dumped" goods by the
country in which the dumping occurs. This problem concerns unfair
trade practices in a domestic economy, and it is difficult for us to
understand why Congress should be bypassed at the crucial policymaking stages and permitted to participate only after policy has been frozen
in an international trade agreement. 2

Senate Concurrent Resolution 38
Notwithstanding this history of concern in the legislative branch,
the American negotiators agreed to the International Antidumping
Code. Unlike other foreign nations whose agreement was contingent on
approval by their legislative bodies, the United States' negotiator signed
the agreement definitively and not subject to ratification.
Upon conclusion of the agreement, Senate Concurrent Resolution
38 was introduced in the Senate to express the sense of that body that

the Code was inconsistent with the Act, that it should be submitted to
the Senate for the latter's advice and consent, and that it should not
become effective in this country until Congress enacted implementing

legislation.
Tariff Commission Report on Senate Concurrent Resolution 38
The Tariff Commission was requested to comment on this
resolution. On March 8, 1968, the Commission sent a report to the
Committee, in which it concluded, by a 3-to-2 majority, that there were
indeed significant inconsistencies between the Code and the Act. In
certain areas, the differences were stated to be so sharp that the
Commission concluded that four out of five then recent affirmative
determinations in which the Commission had found injury under the
Act, might not have resulted in an injury determination if it had had to
apply the Code's standards.
The majority report (Commissioners Sutton, Culliton, and Clubb)
took the position that the Code could not alter domestic law:
It is well settled that the Constitution does not vest in the President
plenary power to alter domestic law. The code, no matter what are the
obligations undertaken by the United States thereunder internationally,
cannot, standing alone without legislative implementation, alter the
provisions of the Antidumping Act or of other U. S. statutes. As

matters presently stand, we believe that the jurisdiction and authority
20

Senate Report 1341, 89th Cong., 2nd Sess., page 3.
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of the Commission to act with respect to dumping of imported articles
is derived wholly from the Antidumping Act and 19 U.S.C. 1337.21
The minority report (Commissioners Metzger and Thunberg)
observed that "the Executive branch has been and is of the view that
the provisions of the Code and the Act are not inconsistent with, and in
conflict with, each other."2 2 With respect to the Treasury's functions
under the Code-the determination of sales at less than fair value-the
Commissioners expressed their "understanding that the Treasury
Department takes the position that none of those provisions requires
implementation in such a way as to be in conflict with any provision of
23
law administered by it."
Commissioners Metzger and Thunberg chose not to proffer any
opinion on the issues raised by Senate Concurrent Resolution 38 (or by
the Code itself) but instead to await the particular facts and
circumstances involved in each case before considering whether the
provisions of the Code would lead to identical or differing results.
Areas of Conflict
A comparison of the provisions of the Code and pertinent United
States statutes shows how the Code limits the discretion of the Tariff
Commission in making an injury determination under the Act, and why
the Senate Committee on Finance concluded that "there are many
areas of significant conflict between the International Antidumping
24
Code and our domestic unfair trade laws.
Injury Test
Section 201(a) of the Antidumping Act states that the Commission "shall determine whether an industry in the United States is
being, or is likely to be, injured, or is prevented from being established
by reason of the importation of such merchandise in the United
States." There are no explicit criteria which define what constitutes an
injury. As already mentioned, the injury test was incorporated into the
statute mainly for administrative reasons.
The history of its origin indicates that Congress did not intend
that an industry had to be "flat on its back" before dumping duties
Report of the Tariff Commission on S. Con. Res. 38, reprinted by the Senate
Committee on Finance, March 13, 1968, pp. 32-33.
22 Id., at 50.
23 Id., at 57.
24 Senate Report 1385, Pt.2, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 4.
21
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could be assessed. In 1951 the Administration sponsored a bill (H.R.
5505) which if enacted into law, would have required a finding that a
domestic industry was being "materially injured," rather than merely
"injured." After a hearing on this matter, the House Ways and Means
Committee specifically refused to incorporate this language into the
statute because it "might be interpreted to require proof of a greater
degree of injury than is required under the existing law" for imposition
of dumping duties.2 5
Under the determinations made by the Tariff Commission, injury
has been construed to mean any harm which is more than de minimis,
i.e., frivolous, inconsequential or immaterial.2 6
At the same time the Tariff Commission has taken the position
that

price discrimination

is not ipso facto injurious, 2

7

and has

determined that the injury must be caused by dumping of the product,
not merely by imports per se. 28
The de-minimis concept of injury has been applied in situations in
which an industry "is likely to be injured" as well as in the more
obvious situation in which an industry "is being injured." In one case,
the Commission majority found that past dumping practices by the
foreign producer (implying a predatory intent), and the capacity and
incentive of the producer to continue dumping practices, were
sufficient to sustain an affirmative determination of likelihood of
9
injury.

2

Although predatory intent is not a pre-requisite to a finding of
injury or a likelihood thereof, its apparent existence has been a relevant
factor in the Commission's determinations of likelihood of injury,
whenever the foreign producer had the ability to carry out such an
intent.
In contrast to the Act, the Code contains specific criteria for
determining what constitutes an injury sufficient to justify assessment
of dumping duties, and also requires a rigid causal relationship between
dumping and injury. Article 3 of the Code states:
A determination of injury shall be made only when the authorities
concerned are satisfied that the dumped imports are demonstrably the
principal cause of material injury or of threat of material injury to a
House Report 1089, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., p.7.
See for example, Cast Iron Soil Pipe from Poland, AA 1921-50 (1967).
27 See for example, Titanium Dioxide from France, AA 1921-31 (1963).
28 Vital Wheat Gluten from Canada, AA 1921-37 (1964).
29 Portland Cement from the Dominican Republic, AA1921-25 (1963).
25

26
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domestic industry or the principal cause of material retardation of the
establishment of such an industry. In reaching their decision the
authorities shall weigh, on one hand, the effect of the dumping and, on
the other hand, all other factors taken together which may be adversely
affecting the industry .... In the case of retarding the establishment of
a new industry in the country of importation, convincing evidence of
the forthcoming establishment of an industry must be shown, for
example, that the plans for a new industry have reached a fairly
advanced stage, a factory is being constructed or machinery has been
ordered. (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, under the criteria of the Code, the Tariff Commission would
be obligated to weigh the effect of the dumping against all other factors
taken together which may be affecting the industry adversely, and only
when the scale is tipped in favor of dumping can an injury
determination be made. No such weighing procedure is required by the
Act, and in the history of cases on which the Commission has passed, it
has not weighed the injury caused by dumped imports against all other
injuries which an industry might be suffering. Certainly, the weighing
procedure is a big departure from the de-minimis concept of injury
which has been applied by the Tariff Commission over the years.
The Tariff Commission concluded that the Code's criteria for
injury are susceptible to two meanings. One interpretation is that if the
importation of dumped goods considered alone does not cause material
injury, there can nevertheless be a determination of material injury if
the aggregate of the effect of all injurious factors results in material
injury, and dumping is the principal causal factor. The second
interpretation, and the one which the Tariff Commission majority
believed that the negotiators intended, is that dumping duties are
sanctioned only in those cases in which the dumped goods are
themselves the cause of material injury, and such injury is greater than
the injury traceable to all other causal factors. The Tariff Commission
concluded that "the Antidumping Act is less restrictive than the Code
under the first interpretation and more restrictive than the Code is
under the second." 3 0
In evaluating the effect of the dumped imports on an industry,
Article 3 of the Code sets forth a further requirement that consideration shall be given to an examination
of all factors having a bearing on the state of the industry in question,
such as: development and prospects with regard to turnover, market
30

Tariff Commission Report on S.Con. Res. 38, pp. 12-13.
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share, profits, prices (including the extent to which the delivered,
duty-paid price is lower or higher than the comparable price for the like
product prevailing in the course of normal commerical transactions in
the importing country), export performance, employment, volume of
dumped and other imports, utilization of capacity of domestic
industry, and productivity; and restrictive trade practices. No one or
several of these factors can necessarily give decisive guidance.
The Antidumping Act is silent as to how the effect of LTFV
imports on an industry shall be evaluated. Incorporated into the statute
as an "administrative convenience," the injury requirement of the Act
should be given a broad (liberal) construction, not the strict construction indicated by the Code. The Act certainly does not contemplate
that dumped imports must be measured against the factors described in
Article 3. It has been administered over the years in a more liberal
manner than would be possible under the rigid requirements of the
Code. The Senate Finance Committee took the position that enumeration of factors in Article 3 of the Code "tends to discount the effect of
dumping." The Committee concluded:
Coupled with the requirements that those factors which are adverse be
lumped together and weighed against the effect of dumping-and that if
dumping survives this test, it must be compared to the totality of
factors affecting an industry (both adversely and favorably)-the care
with which these nondumping factors are specifically enumerated in the
Code casts serious doubt on whether dumping could ever be found to
cause injury to an industry which otherwise exhibits any sign of
economic health .... Applying the literal language of Article 3 could
lead to the absurd result that an industry which is suffering reverses for
reasons unrelated to dumping could get no relief from dumping because
other factors were causing its troubles; and that an industry which is
prospering despite dumping could get no relief because it is not
suffering. Thus, under the Code it would appear that relief from
dumping would be available only in the rare instance where an industry
is found to be in excellent economic health immediately before the
dumping begins and to be suffering losses soon after the dumping
begins, and no other reason can be found to account for the reversal.
Such a sharp change from the concept in present law of finding injury
when it is more than de-minimis cannot be effected without a change in
the law.3
Definition of an Industry
One of the controversial subjects which has been considered by
the Tariff Commission, even prior to the existence of the International
31

Senate Report 1385, Pt. 2, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 11.
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Antidumping Code, is the scope to be given to the term in the Act of
"an industry in the United States." The Tariff Commission has held, in
some instances, that the producers in or serving a portion of the United
States rather than all of the producers in the entire country, constituted
"an industry" within the meaning of our statute. The competitive
market areas were of varying sizes, and have consisted in some cases of
3
one or two states, and in others, parts of one or more states. 2
In some cases, a few domestic producers who did not have their
plants located within such competitive market areas were deemed to
constitute "an industry." 3 In other cases in which the market area was
served by a limited number of producers, the Tariff Commission
considered such producers to be an industry within the meaning of the
Act. 3 In every situation, the Tariff Commission has considered the
injury caused to "an industry" in a collective sense: it did not make its
determination dependent on whether each producer in the industry
involved was individually injured.
Moreover, consonant with the flexible concept of industry in the
Act, more than one industry, or an industry producing competitive
products, even though unlike the dumped imports, may be involved in a
given case under consideration by the Tariff Commission. For example,
in the past the Commission has considered imports of narrow glass
panes in the context of three separate domestic industries--the flat-glass
industry, the jalousie-glass-louver industry, and the jalousie-window
industry. In another investigation, the Tariff Commission considered
the effects of imports of nepheline syenite on the domestic feldspar
industry.
In contrast to this flexible-industry concept in the Act, as it has
been applied by the Tariff Commission over the years, the Code again
contains specific criteria which tend to limit the Commission's
discretion in determining what constitutes an industry. Article 4 of the
Code defines industry as follows:
32

United Kingdom, Cast Iron Soil Pipe, Treasury Department Release, October 27,

1955 (California); Portland Cement from Sweden, AA 1921-16, 1961 (North Atlantic Seaboard
of three states); Portland Cement from Belgium, AA 1921-19 (East Coast of Florida); Portland
Cement from the Dominican Republic, AA 1921-25, 1962 (Puerto Rico and Metropolitan New
York City); Chromic Acid from Australia, AA 1921-32 (West Coast, accounting for ten percent
of domestic consumption); Carbon Steel Bars and Shapes from Canada AA 1921-39 (Oregon
and Washington, accounting for five per cent of domestic consumption).
33 Portland Cement from Sweden, Portugal and Dominican Republic, supra.
34 Steel Reinforcing Bars from Canada, AA 1921-33; Carlson Steel Bars and Shapes
from Canada, AA 1921-39; Steel Jacks from Canada, AA 1921-49.
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(a) In determining injury the term "domestic industry" shall be
interpreted as referring to the domestic producers as a whole of the like
products or to those of them whose collective output of the products
constitutes a major proportion of the total domestic production of
those products except that
(i) when producers are importers of the allegedly dumped
product the industry may be interpreted as referring to the
rest of the producers;
(ii) in exceptional circumstances a country may, for the
production in question, be divided into two or more competitive markets and the producers within each market regarded as
a separate industry, if, because of transport costs, all the
producers within such a market sell all or almost all of their
production of the product in question in that market, and
none, or almost none, of the product in question produced
elsewhere in the country is sold in that market or if there exist
special regional marketing conditions (for example, traditional
patterns of distribution or consumer tastes) which result in an
equal degree of isolation of the producers in such a market
from the rest of the industry, provided, however, that injury
may be found in such circumstances only if there is injury to
all or almost all of the total production of the product in the
market as defined.
(b) Where two or more countries have reached such a level of
integration that they have the characteristics of a single, unified market,
the industry in the entire area of integration shall be taken to be the
industry referred to in Article 4 (a).
(c) [The effect of the dumped imports shall be assessed in relation
to the domestic production of the like product when available data
permit the separate identification of production in terms of such
criteria as: the production process, the producers' realizations, profits.
When the domestic production of the like product has no separate
identity in these terms the effect of the dumped imports shall be
assessed by the examination of the product of the narrowest group or
range of products, which includes the like product, for which the
necessary information can be provided.1 31
The Tariff Commission's report to the Committee on Finance
stated:
The Code does not parallel U. S. precedent as to what constitutes the
industry, or industries, to be considered under the Antidumping Act.
For example, it only allows consideration of the effect of imports on
one industry-that which produces a product identical to the "dumped
imports, or failing such production, that which produces another
3S Article 4(c) states that the provisions of Article 3(d) shall be applicable to Article 4.

Accordingly, the language of 3(d) has been substituted therefor.
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product which, although not alike in all respects, has characteristics
closely resembling those of the product under consideration." Under
the Antidumping Act, the Commission has considered whether "an
industry" is being injured. There is no qualification as to the kind of

industry nor the number of industries that might be affected by the
imports under consideration. 3 6
The like-product concept of an industry required by the Code
narrows the Commission's discretion as to what industry can be harmed
by dumped imports. It permits imports to be compared to only one
industry-that which produces the like product. Moreover, as stated,
the Code's competitive-market-area criteria for determining the industry are so restrictive that, in the judgment of the Tariff Commission,
four out of five affirmative determinations might not have been made
had the Code been in effect when the determinations were made.
Under the Code's regional-industry concept, "all, or almost all, of
the producers" within a market area must be injured before there could
be an affirmative determination of injury. The Tariff Commission has
never limited its affirmative determinations of injury to cases in which
"all, or almost all, of the producers" were injured or likely to be injured
by dumped imports.'
In some cases, the Commission has found that sales at less than
fair value in a competitive market area were injuring a national industry
even though a sizable portion of the total number of producers may not
individually have experienced material injury, nor were likely to
experience such injury within the foreseeable future.3 '
In other Federal statutes concerning price discrimination, there are
no restrictions on the administering agency's definition of an industry.
Thus, the Revenue Act of 1916 specifies that "any person injured in his
business or property" by reason of predatory dumping may sue for
treble damages.
Simultaneous Investigations of Injury
Another area in which the Code differs substantially from the Act,
relates to the question of simultaneity in the injury investigation. The
Code requires [Article 5(b), (c)] that:
Upon initiation of an investigation and thereafter, the evidence of both
dumping and injury should be considered simultaneously in any event,
36
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and the evidence of both dumping and injury shall be considered
simultaneously in the decision of whether or not to initiate an
investigation, and thereafter during the course of the investigation....
An application shall be rejected and an investigation shall be terminated
promptly as soon as the authorities concerned are satisfied that there is
not sufficient evidence of either dumping or of injury to justify
proceeding with the case.
In the Customs Simplification Act of 1954, the injury determination was transferred from the Treasury Department's jurisdiction to
that of the Tariff Commission. Treasury Department spokesmen have
acknowledged that the role of the Department in a dumping investigation is "purely arithmetical"; and that the question of injury is within
the responsibility of the Tariff Commission. In testimony before the
Committee on Ways and Means of the House of Representatives,
Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury David W. Kendall stated:
The Treasury Department determines the arithmetical price differential
between the foreign country's sale price and the sales to us in the
foreign country. That is purely arithmetical .... The Tariff Commission
determines whether or not there has been injury .... and we feel that
with the Administration determining arithmetic, and the Tariff Commission determining whether or not there is injury, as fair an approach
as possible is made. 3 9
The Senate viewed the Code's emphasis on simultaneous investigations of price discrimination and injury as contrary to the law. In its
report on the proposed Renegotiation Amendments Act of 1968, the
Senate Committee on Finance took the position that:
There are only two ways the simultaneous investigation of dumping and
injury required by the Code can occur, and in the opinion of the
Committee both are contrary to the Act. First, the Tariff Commission
might be expected to commence an investigation of injury at the same
time Treasury initiates an investigation of sales at less than fair value.
However, this would conflict with the provision of the Act which
confers jurisdiction on the Tariff Commission only after the Treasury
Department has made a determination of sales at less than fair value.
Alternatively, the Treasury Department might be expected to undertake a determination of the injury question during its investigation of
the price matter. However, this would be contrary to the objective of
the Customs Simplification Act which removed the injury factor from
Treasury's jurisdiction.
As a practical matter, both alternatives are administratively
impossible, because neither the Commission nor the Treasury can
39 Hearings before the House Committee on Ways and Means on Amendments to the
Arptidumping Act of 1921, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 46. See note 11, supra.

480

INTERNATIONAL LA WYER

properly investigate the injury potential of the dumped imports
without knowing what is the "margin of dumping.''40
The executive-branch analysis of the International Code expresses
the position that "the Treasury Department will not, however,
undertake to evaluate information bearing on injury" which is called
for by Section 53.27(e) of the Treasury Department's new antidumping
regulations (19 CFR Part 53).4 ' In testifying before the Senate Finance
Committee on this question, the General Counsel of the Treasury
Department, Fred B. Smith, stated "we do not make a judgment even"
of the evidence submitted. 4 2 Since, as the Senate Finance Committee's
report points out, the Tariff Commission, which is charged with
determination of injury, can do so only after the Treasury determination of dumping (19 CFR § § 53.38, 53.40), the Codal requirement of
simultaneity simply cannot be reconciled with the scheme of the
Antidumping Act in this regard.
Price Undertaking
Like the evidence-of-injury requirement of the Code, the following
requirement in Article 7 of the Code has no parallel in the Act:
Antidumping proceedings may be terminated without imposition of
antidumping duties, or provisional measures, upon receipt of a
voluntary undertaking by the exporters to revise their prices so that the
margin of dumping is eliminated, or to cease to export to the area in
question at dumped prices....

The Tariff Commission report stated:
None of the unfair trade statutes cited in this report specifically provide

a mechanism for the violator of the statute concerned to avoid the
remedial or penal actions directed to be taken thereunder by his
agreement to conform to the law after he is caught. The Code
4 3 in this
respect does not appear to conform with any of the statutes.
It is true that the Treasury Department has for some time closed
out cases on the basis of price revisions. The importance of this practice
40 "Margin of dumping" is the amount equal to the difference between the
home-market price of the foreign article and the lower price for which it is sold for export in
the United States. The amount of the margin in a particular case is determined by the Treasury
Department, and is accepted without review by the Tariff Commission.
41 Executive Branch Analysis of International Antidumping Code in Relation to
Antidumping Act, 1921, reprinted in Hearings before the Senate Committee on Finance on the
International Antidumping Code, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 295.
42 Hearings before- the Committee on Finance, U. S. Senate, on the International
Antidumping Code, June 27, 1968, p. 36.
43 Tariff Commission Report on S. Con. Res. 37, p. 27.
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is manifest when one considers that there were more cases dismissed by
the Treasury (89) between 1955 and 1967, for price revision, than
there were sent to the Tariff Commission for an injury determination
(52) over this period. However, despite the fact that this practice has
been in effect since 1955, the Senate Committee on Finance took the
following position with respect to this issue:
"Forgiveness of dumping," where a foreign producer agrees to raise his
price (to prevent a finding of sales of less than fair value), or gives
assurance of no further sales at dumped prices, is not a proper function
of the Treasury Department in administering the Antidumping Act. If
there are sales at less than fair value, Treasury should make a finding to
that effect, and refer the case to the Tariff Commission for an injury
investigation. If there is no injury, then the finding of sales at less than
fair value is meaningless, and assurances of price adjustments (or to
cease the shipments at the lower price) serve to require American
consumers to pay more for the foreign goods than they would
otherwise have to. On the other hand, acceptance of the price
undertaking by the Treasury prevents the Tariff Commission from
undertaking an injury investigation, and in this respect it not only
becomes equivalent to an injury determination by the Treasury
Department but also constitutes a loophole for sporadic dumping of
foreign goods into this country. 4 4
Another problem arising out of the price-revision practice is that
there is no official report of the agreements made with respect to price
changes. A party not privy to the negotiations would find it difficult to
determine just how the Act is being administered.
To be fair, however, one should recognize that the arguments
underlying the price revision practice in which the Treasury has engaged
over the years are not wholly invalid. First, the theory justifying the
closing out of dumping cases after price revision is that the complainant
has obtained the relief he was after-the stopping of dumping. In this
regard, it should be noted that the Treasury informed the Committee
that it does not close out a case on a price-revision basis without the
Second, the
complainant's consent, either expressed or implied. 4
practice was encouraged by the Tariff Commission decision in the first
French rayon fiber case, 24 Fed. Reg. 10092 (1959), in which the
Commission, after noting price revision and the complainant's lack of
interest in pursuing the case, stated: "The Commission is of the view
that a case of this kind should not be presented to the Tariff
Senate Report 1385, Pt. 2, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 10.
Hearing before the Committee on Finance, U. S. Senate, on the International
Antidumping Code, June 27, 1968, p. 190.
44
45
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Commission for a determination of injury." The Commission added
that "the Antidumping Act was intended to be preventive rather than
punitive." Finally, the Treasury questions whether any enforcement
advantage would accrue from sending price revision cases to the
Commission. Once the importer is on notice that appraisement of the
goods has been withheld, the natural tendency is to cut down on
imports which can subject him to dumping duties. Consequently, it can
be argued that the amount of the duties, if there is a determination of
injury and a finding of dumping, can be minimal or nonexistant, and
the dumping investigation would have been prolonged to no useful
purpose.
Recently, the Treasury Department has begun to spell out, in
greater detail, the reasons in each price-revision case for either closing it
out, or sending it to the Tariff Commission despite the revision. In
sending the Titanium Dioxide from Japan case to the Tariff Commission on February 24, 1966, the Treasury noted:
The November 24, 1965, Notice of Intent was based on the theory that
there had been price revisions and cessation of shipments which
brought the case within the purview of 19 CFR 14.7(v)(9). This
provision of the regulations is not construed to prevent the Secretary of
the Treasury from making determinations of sales at less than fair value
where the sales to the United States which are complained of, made
before the price revision or cessation of shipments, are considered
sufficiently substantial so as to constitute "hit and run" dumping.
Under the circumstances of this case, it is determined that sufficient
evidence is present in connection with the sales made prior to the price
revision to justify referring the case to the United States Tariff
Commission for a determination as to whether or not such sales injured
an industry in the United States.4 6
The Treasury has informed the Committee that in the future it
will give, in similar detail, its reasons for the disposition of a case.' '
For all of the above reasons, the conferees to the Renegotiation
Extension Act of 1968, in dealing with the Senate amendment on

dumping, deleted those provisions which would have prevented the
Treasury from continuing its practice of closing out a case on the basis
of price revisions. Nevertheless, because those cases which are "closed
out" are considered by many to be the more important ones, which are
likely to result in an injury determination, the Congress will keep a

46
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close watch on this aspect of Treasury's role in a dumping case to make
sure that the intent of the statute is not being violated.
Regional Dumping Duties
In another provision [Article 8(e)] the Code states that when
dumping and injury are found to exist in a particular regional market
area, dumping duties shall be assessed only against imports into that
region. Such a requirement is not only contrary to domestic law but
also violates the provision in the Constitution which requires that duties
be assessed on a geographically uniform basis. 4 8
Obviously, this portion of the Code, which is mandatory, cannot
be applied by the United States. The Executive branch analysis of the
International Antidumping Code recognized that "this requirement
cannot be satisfied under the Act. . .it would raise problems under the
sixth clause of section 9 of Article I of the Constitution." 9
Partial Dumping Duties
In still another provision of the Code [Article 8(a)], it is specified
that the amount of duty collected shall be less than the margin of
dumping if such duty is sufficient to remove the injury to a domestic
industry. The domestic law does not provide for partial dumping duties.
To the contrary, it specifically requires that the duty collected be equal
to the full amount of the difference between the dumped price and the
fair price. This provision was described in the Executive branch analysis
submitted to the Committee as a "hortatory provision which therefore
creates no inconsistency with the Act."
Senate Amendment to H.R. 17324
The report of the Tariff Commission on S. Con. Res. 38, and the
concern expressed by interested parties with respect to the conflict
between the International Antidumping Code and domestic law, led the
Committee on Finance to schedule a public hearing which was held on
June 27, 1968. The hearing, far from establishing the validity of the
Code, confirmed the conflict between it and domestic law.
Following the hearing, the Committee went into executive session,
considered the matter, and approved an amendment to H. R. 17324
48

Article 1, §9, cl. 6.

49 Hearings before the Committee on Finance, U. S. Senate, on the International

Antidumping Code, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess., June 27, 1968.
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which, among other things, would have suspended the application of
the International Antidumping Code insofar as it applied to articles
imported into the United States. Pursuant to an unusual procedural
step, the Senate, on July 26, 1968, recommitted H. R. 17324 to the
Committee on Finance with instructions to report it back immediately
with the antidumping amendment (and another amendment to extend
U. S. participation in the International Coffee Agreement) with it. This
was done, and a supplemental committee report relating to these two
amendments were filed." The purpose of the Committee amendment
was explained in the committee report as follows:
Because it cannot be reconciled with the domestic law, the
International Antidumping Code cannot and must not be applied in this

country until the domestic law has been amended to eliminate the
inconsistencies. For these reasons, the Committee on Finance has
approved an amendment to specifically bar the operation of the Code
until the law is subsequently amended to authorize it. Under the
amendment the new Treasury regulations would be suspended and the
Secretary of the Treasury would be directed to perform his duties and
functions under the Antidumping Act as he did prior to July 1.

However, he would not be authorized to exercise discretion with
respect to the question of injury. This injury determination was

transferred by statute out of Treasury jurisdiction and placed in the
Tariff Commission back in 1954.
In addition, the Tariff Commission would be directed by the
amendment to perform its duties and functions under the Antidumping
Act in accordance with precedents established prior to July 1 in

affirmative findings of injury.
Finally, the amendment directs both the Tariff Commission and
the Treasury Department to perform their duties and functions under

the Antidumping Act without regard to the provisions of the
International Antidumping Code until such time as Congress enacts

legislation to implement it. 5 1
The Renegotiation Extension Act passed the Senate on September
11, 1968, with this and other amendments. The House disagreed with
the Senate amendments, and requested a conference with the Senate,
at which a compromise solution to the "dumping problem" was
reached.
The Conference Agreement
In resolving the dilemma, on the one hand, of not wanting to
abrogate an international agreement into which the United States had
50 Senate Report 1385, Part 2, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess.
5 1

Id., at 14.
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entered with seventeen foreign nations, but, on the other hand, of not
wishing that such agreement change domestic law as it has been applied
over a period of more than 46 years of case history, the conferees on
the Renegotiation Amendments Act of 1968 reached agreement which
provides inter alia:
Nothing contained in the International Antidumping Code, signed at
Geneva on June 30, 1967, shall be construed to restrict the discretion
of the United States Tariff Commission in performing its duties and
functions under the Antidumping Act, 1921.52
In explaining the object of the conference report to the Senate on
October 7, 1968, the author of this article, as Chairman of the
Committee on Finance and manager of the bill, was authorized by the
conferees to state:
The area in which the Code seems to have the greatest impact
concerning the discretion of the Tariff Commission is determining the
definition of an industry which is suffering unfair price competition
and the degree of harm needed to justify an affirmative finding of
injury. The manner in which the Code narrowed this discretion was
presented in a report submitted to the Committee by the Tariff
Commission back in March of this year .... On this broad issue-that
the judgment of the Tariff Commission must remain unfettered-the
House conferees were in agreement with the position taken by the
Senate.' 3
In explaining the same aspect of the conference report to the
House of Representatives on October 10, 1968, Chairman Mills of the
Committee on Ways and Means said:
The Congress has not felt it necessary to limit the scope or provide
more specific definitions of such terms as "industry" and "injury"
under the Act. In this respect, it has continued to grant the Secretary of
the Treasury and Tariff Commission a great deal of discretion in
carrying out their respective duties and responsibilities under the Act,
and in treating each case on its individual merits .... The Code provides
for the definition of such terms as "dumping," "injury" and "industry," as well as specifying certain investigation and administrative
procedures to be followed by the parties to the agreement .... The
Conference amendment speaks for itself in maintaining the full
statutory discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury and the United
States Tariff Commission under the Antidumping Act in the performance of their duties and functions. 54

52

Conference Report 1951, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 1.

53 114 Congressional Record S12163, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess.
54

114 Congressional Record H. 9750, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess.
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The Congressional intent, therefore, with respect to the first part
of the amendment dealing with the discretion of the Tariff Commission
should be readily apparent even from a cursory reading of the statute.
Thus, any provision of the Code which limits the discretion of the
Tariff Commission in its injury-investigation function is not to be taken
into account by that Commission. Such provisions are not to be
weighed or used as guides by the administrators in the performance of
their responsibilities under the Act. On the contrary, they are to be
ignored. Two important features of the Code which did restrict the
discretion of the Tariff Commission dealt with (1) the determination of
what constitutes an industry for the purpose of an antidumping
investigation, and (2) the degree of injury required to invoke the
remedy provided by the statute. Both of these features are made
inapplicable by the conference report.
The conference agreement on the dumping issue also provided that:
in performing their duties and functions under such act (the Antidumping Act of 1921) the Secretary of the Treasury and the Tariff

Commission shall-first, resolve any conflict between the International
Antidumping Code and the Antidumping Act, 1921, in favor of the Act
as applied by the agency administering the Act; and second, take into
account the provisions of the International Antidumping Code only
insofar as they are consistent with the Antidumping Act of 1921 as
applied by the agency administering the Act.

The intent of this part of the conference agreement was explained
to the Senate on October 7, 1968, in the following terms:
The Act as applied by the agency administering it refers to the body of
law, rules, and practices built up by the agency in its administration of

the Act over the years. s 5
In other words, the committee was saying that it is not enough to
look to the cold language of the Act in determining whether any
conflict exists with the International Antidumping Code; prior determinations, prior practices and prior procedures must also be considered.
The effect of this is that Congress has forbidden the Executive Branch
and the Tariff Commission to interpret the Antidumping Act more
narrowly in the future than in the past by virtue of the negotiation of
the International Antidumping Code.
The provisions agreed upon in conference also included a
requirement set forth in Section 201(b) that the President no later than
August 1, 1969, is to submit to the House and Senate a report for the
period beginning July 1, 1968 and ending June 30, 1969 which would:
s5 114 Congressional Record S12168, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess.
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(1) Set out the text of all determinations made by the Secretary

of the Treasury and the United States Tariff Commission under the
Antidumping Act, 1921, in such period;
(2) Analyze with respect to each determination in such period the
manner in which the Antidumping Act, 1921, has been administered to
take into account the provisions of the International Antidumping
Code;

(3) Summarize antidumping actions taken by other countries in
such period against United States exports and relate such actions to the
provisions of the International Antidumping Code; and
(4) Include such recommendations as the President determines
appropriate concerning the administration of the Antidumping Act,
1921.
This report could provide a basis for further consideration of the
problems which result from superimposing the International Antidumping Code on to the provisions of domestic law applicable to
dumped imports.
Summary
The International Antidumping Code was negotiated without
advance authority by Congress, in the face of a strict admonition by the
Senate not to change the Antidumping Act in any way. Apart from the
question as to whether the President has authority to enter into
international agreements with foreign nations in an area which the
Constitution reserves exclusively to the Congress, it is settled law that
when an agreement has the effect of changing existing domestic law,
either directly, or by indirection through giving the law a meaning and a
result which Congress never intended, the agreement cannot be given
effect until it has been submitted to Congress for implementing
legislation.' 6 The Code was not so submitted by the United States,
although all other signatories did submit the Code to their parliamentary bodies for approval.
In this connection the Restatement states:
"Effect on Domestic Law of Executive Agreement Pursuant to President's Constitutional Authority.
(1) An ,executive agreement, made by the United States without reference to a treaty or
act of Congress, conforming to the constitutional limitations stated in §121, and
manifesting an intention that it shall become effective as domestic law of the United States
at the time it becomes binding on the United States
(a) supersedes inconsistent provisions of the laws of the several states, but
(b) does not supersede inconsistent provisions of earlier acts of Congress."
Restatement (Second) of the Law of Foreign Relations of the United States §144
(1965).
56
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From a review of the Code's provisions, it became evident not
only to the Committee on Finance and the Senate, but also to the
conferees on the part of the House, that they would give a meaning to
the Act which could change the results of a given case decided under
the broad language of the statute alone. It was clear, for example, that
the rigid injury and industry definitions embodied in the Code did, in
fact, limit the discretion of the Tariff Commission in its injury-investigative function although spokesmen for the Executive argued that the
Code merely gave specific meaning to the general language of the
law.S 7
Under the Antidumping Act of 1921, the Tariff Commission was
given the responsibility of determining whether or not an industry is
being, or is likely to be, injured by dumped imports. In exercising this
statutory responsibility, the Commission has used the widest discretion
over the years in applying the Act to the facts of each case. It would
not be able to retain the latitude of discretion which it now enjoys if it
were required to apply the rigid industry and injury criteria of the
Code, but would have been compelled to accept the interpretation of
the Act which the executive branch embodied in the Code. This
interpretation would admittedly restrict the Commission's discretion,
and in one area alone, four out of five recent affirmative determinations
under the Act might not have been made if the Tariff Commission had
applied the Code's rigid criteria. The key to the Senate's interpretation
of this situation was embodied in the report of its Committee on
Finance on the proposed amendment to the Renegotiation Act which
would have suspended the Code's application. That report stated:
Changing the results of a case by international agreement is tantamount
to changing the law itself and enabling legislation must precede the
implementation of the agreement. 5 8
The Constitution states that (1) the Constitution, (2) laws made in
pursuance thereof, and (3) treaties made under the authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme law of the land.5 9 Article 1,
Section 8 of the Constitution specifically delegates to the Congress the
That the Code does indeed limit the discretion of the Tariff Commission is admitted
by all, including John B. Rehm, General Counsel for the Office of Special Trade Representative
and one of the United States negotiators of the Code. Mr. Rehm stated before the Committee
on Finance: "My only basic point is that while we may, I emphasize the words 'while we may,'
and in some respects I think probably have changed-I will use another word 'limited'-the
discretion of the Tariff Commission, so that they might not arrive at the same decision that
they have in the past, we have not in our view changed the law."
58 Senate Report 1385, Pt. 2, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 6.
s9 Article Vi, cl. 2.
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power "to regulate commerce with foreign nations," and clearly an
international agreement which is not a law made pursuant to the
Constitution, nor a treaty, but which sets standards which are to be
applied by a Commission set up by the Congress in the sphere of
"regulating commerce," does not stand on an equal footing with
statutory law.

